## **State Department review completed**

America 1962

Mr. Reger Hilleman Department of State Washington M. D. C.

Dear Reger:

Just to heap the record straight. I have the following comments on your internal memorandum, "Alexanese of U. S. Intelligence Agencies to Berlin Developments. "

The important item yes emisted was the fact that the National indications Coulon, which is in fact the staff of the Watch Committee, operates on a 24-hour-a-day basis in furtherence of its untenten responsibilities as assigned by USIB. It is regretted that the three slets, desiganted to be filled by the State Department, remain unfilled. I note in your paragraph I that the State Department 'has a 26-hour watch procedure which studies all sources for indications of Seviet the actions and intentions," This is entactly what the Fatianal Indications Conter is charged with doing and I ungo that you consider assigning some of your slort people to fill the urgest requirement for State representation in the National indications Conter. You may consider this the third formal insertion of the M-inch seedle.

One further comment -- ! feel reasonably cortain that the entire intelligence community (in connection with your paragraph 2) has alerted their eversess posts to be on a similar short -- we in the Central latelligence Agency have of course done so.

Yours in the faith, and

Faithfully yours,

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Mounthall S. Carter Lieutenant Comerni, USA Deputy Director

THE DIRECTOR OF 62-5-597/

August 7, 1962

CIA - General Carter

Attached is a copy of the Intelligence Community's focus on Berlin which Mr. Hilsman discussed with you by telephone today.

William F. Eaton Staff Assistant Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002900250026-8

DEPAL MINT OF STATE THE DIRECTOR OF MUZILIGENCE AND RESEARCH

BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand

AUG

ROM

INR - Roger Hilsman

SUBJECT:

Alertness of U.S. Intelligence Agencies to

Berlin Developments

In recent weeks increasing indications of possible Soviet initiatives on Berlin have led the intelligence community to take a number of special alert measures in addition to the standard watch procedures. A summary of both the old and the new alert measures follows.

1. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department has a 24-hour watch procedure which studies all sources for indications of Soviet bloc actions and intentions; appropriate analysts are on 24-hour

2. The State Department has instructed key posts to be on the alert for, and to report promptly, any evidence of Soviet diplomatic activity which may foreshadow signature of a separate peace treaty.

3. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides continuing intelligence support for the Berlin Task Force and reviews its assessment of Soviet intentions on a weekly basis.

4. All agencies in the intelligence community maintain 24-hour watches which follow Berlin developments intensively and NSA has been asked to be especially alert to early indications of possible Soviet or East derman moves.

5. The USIB Watch Committee has been considering Berlin issues regularly at its weekly meetings and is prepared to convene at any time to consider indications of an impending crisis.

- 6. The members of the intelligence community's Berlin working group are in constant communication in evaluating incoming information and the group is prepared to meet at any time to assess current developments.
- 7. The Special National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions which was prepared on July 25 is under continuing review and will be promptly updated as soon as this becomes necessary.

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Through effective liaison a rangements with the foreign intelligence services, U.S. agencies abroad receive their reports on Berlin. These reports are promptly transmitted to Washington and are carefully reviewed by the U.S. intelligence community. In the past, some of the material on Berlin received from foreign pervices, particularly the West German intelligence service, has evidently been planted by communist sources for "wer of nerves" purposes. The recent West German report of a 20-point plan on Berlin may well be a case in point.

It must be noted, however, that all the U.S. intelligence effort does not protect us from possible surprises. Such local actions as, e.g., harassments in the air corridor, association of East Germans with Soviet officials in control over access routes, or actions against rail service to Berlin, could be taken by the Soviet Union and the GDR with little or no warning. On the other hand, the Soviet Union will probably prepare for the signature of a separate peace treaty in a deliberate and public fashion; we are likely to have advance word of Soviet diplomatic activity prior to a peace conference and we believe that the Soviets will issue invitations to a "formal" peace conference before signing a separate peace treaty.

At the USIB meeting August 8 I will again raise the question of intelligence community alertness on Berlin and suggest that each agency consider whether further steps need to be taken to improve the state of alertness.

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